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Complaints Must Plead Non-Conclusory Facts that
Manifest Plausibility to Survive a Motion to Dismiss
in All Civil Cases: Ashcroft v. Iqbal
CIVIL PROCEDURE-PLEADING-PLAUSIBILITY-FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(A)(2)-FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
12(B)(6)-The United States Supreme Court held that to survive a
motion to dismiss, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly mandates that
complaints in all civil matters must plead enough factual matter
that, if accepted as true, plausibly entitles the plaintiff to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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I. THE FACTS OF IQBAL
In November of 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested Respondent
Javaid Iqbal, a native of Pakistan and a Muslim.' The FBI named
him a person of high interest in the inquiry regarding the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.2 The FBI imprisoned all high-
interest individuals, including Iqbal, in the Administrative Maxi-
mum Special Housing Unit ("ADMAX SHU') in the Brooklyn, New
York Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC").3 Iqbal pled guilty
to fraud in relation to forging identification documents and con-
spiring to defraud the United States.4 After completing his sen-
tence, he was deported to Pakistan. 5
Iqbal contended that while detained in the ADAX SHU, MDC
employees brutally beat him, refused him medical care,6 conducted
daily strip and body cavity searches,7 denied him food,8 disallowed
him to contact defense counsel,9 interrupted his religious studies,' 0
taunted him," left him outdoors in the rain,'2 and turned on his
1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942-43 (2009).
2. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943. After receiving over 96,000 tips, the FBI questioned over
1000 individuals, detaining 762 for immigration violations. Id. The FBI named each of the
184 prisoners of Arab descent and Islamic faith in New York City "of high interest"-
including Iqbal. Id.
3. Id. at 1943. Prisoners in the ADMAX SHU (the most restrictive form of imprison-
ment permitted by the Bureau of Prisons) spend twenty-three hours a day in their cells. Id.
ADMAX SHU inmates receive one hour of outdoors time, where they remain shackled and
surrounded by four correctional officers. Id. Iqbal remained in the ADMAX SHU from
January 8, 2002, until the conclusion of July 2002. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 149 (2d
Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3417 (2008) (No. 07-1015), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009).
4. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing Hasty, 490 F.3d at 147-48).
5. Id. at 1943.
6. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 149. Iqbal claimed two instances of beatings, once upon his
arrival in the ADMAX SHU and two months later in March. Id. For two weeks after the
second beating, Iqbal claimed to experience severe pain, yet the MDC presumptively denied
him medical care. Id. During the beatings, MDC staff "kicked [Iqbal] in the stomach,
punched him in the face, and dragged him across" the floor. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (quot-
ing First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand para. 113, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No.
04.CV-01809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff'd, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.
2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jun 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015), rev'd, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009), 2004 WL 3756442 [hereinafter Complaint]).
7. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 149.
8. Id. Judge Newman wrote that during his captivity in the MDC, Iqbal purportedly
lost over forty pounds. Id.
9. Id. If Iqbal voiced concerns over his treatment, officers severed the phone and
withheld correspondence. Id.
10. Id. Iqbal was allowed to engage in neither daily nor Friday prayer, and MDC em-
ployees removed his Koran. Id.
11. Id. Iqbal asserted be was called a "Muslim killer" and "terrorist." Id.
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air conditioning in the winter and heating in the summer.'3 Pur-
suant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,'4 Iqbal
filed a complaint consisting of twenty-one causes of action against
nineteen correctional officers and thirty-four federal officials, in-
cluding the Petitioners: former Attorney General John D.
Ashcroft and FBI Director Edward Mueller.' 5
Iqbal asserted that Ashcroft and Mueller violated his First and
Fifth Amendment rights by identifying him as a person of high
interest in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the basis
that he was a Pakistani Muslim.' 6 Specifically, Iqbal implicated
Mueller in the management of the FBI-whose agents imprisoned
many other Arab Muslim men17-and both Ashcroft and Mueller
in creating a policy that justified the keeping of detainees in the
ADiVAX SHU until the FBI could disprove a captive's links to ter-
rorism.' 8 The complaint claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller inten-
tionally placed detainees in the ADNVIAX SHU exclusively because
they were Arab Muslim men.' 9
12. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 149. Iqbal purported that employees at the MDC activated the
air conditioning in his cell after placing him outside in the rain "for hours." Id.
13. Id.
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, plaintiff filed suit against federal narcotics agents
who arrested him inside his home and in front of his family, alleging that agents made the
arrest with neither probable cause nor a warrant. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Both the dis-
trict court and Second Circuit dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Id. at 390. The Supreme Court reversed and held that a private
citizen may recover money damages from a federal agent in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 397-98. The Bivens Court "recognized for the first time an implied
private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's con-
stitutional rights." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947-48 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 66 (2001)).
15. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1943.
16. Id. at 1944.
17. Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 6, para. 47). The complaint stated that "[iun the
months after September 11, 2001, the [FBI], under the direction of [Petitioner) MUELLER,
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men. ... as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11." Complaint, supra note 6, para. 47.
18. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1944 (citing Complaint, supra note 6, para. 69). The complaint
claimed, "[t~he policy of holding post-September-ilth detainees in highly restrictive condi-
tions of confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by [Petitioners]
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001." Com-
plaint, supra note 6, para. 69.
19. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct at 1944 (citing Complaint, supra note 6, para. 96). Iqbal's com-
plaint alleged that "[Petitioners] ASHCROFT [and] MUELLER ... each knew of, condoned,
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to these conditions of confinement as
a matter of policy, solely on account of their religion, race, and/or national origin and for no
legitimate penological interest." Complaint, supra note 6, para. 96. Justice Kennedy also
noted that Iqbal's complaint labeled Ashcroft the "principal architect" of the discriminatory
policy with Mueller as "instrumental in [the policy's] adoption, promulgation, and imple-
mentation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 10, 11).
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Il. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF IQBAL
After Iqbal filed his complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, Ashcroft and Mueller (as well as
other defendants who did not appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court) moved to dismiss the complaint because it failed to
plead sufficient facts to show that their own personal actions vio-
lated the Constitution.20 The district court denied the motion to
dismiss, citing the rule in Conley v. Gibson21 that a motion to dis-
miss should only be granted if no set of presumptively true facts
would warrant relief to the pleader.22 While Ashcroft and Mueller
filed an interlocutory appeal 23 pursuant to the collateral-order doc-
trine,24 the United States Supreme Court overruled Conley in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.25
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
order denying the motion to dismiss.26 It interpreted Twombly to
mean that assertions made in a complaint must be plausible, and
only those claims not plausible require further factual evidence to
defeat a motion to dismiss. 27 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Cabranes urged the United States Supreme Court to clarify the
correct pleading standard for complaints in cases where govern-
ment official defendants raise qualified immunity as a defense. 28
20. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. Ehab Elmaghraby originally filed suit as a co-plaintiff
with Iqbal. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 147. Mr. Elmaghraby and the United States settled the suit
for $300,000. Id.
21. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22. fqbal, 129 S. ct. at 1944. The district court explained that, if the purported facts in
Iqbal's complaint were correct, "it cannot be said that there [is] no set of facts on which
(respondent] would be entitled to relief as against" Ashcroft and Mueller. Id.
23. An interlocutory appeal is "[amn appeal that occurs before the trial court's final
ruling on the entire case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (9th ed. 2009).
24. The collateral-order doctrine is a "doctrine allowing appeal from an interlocutory
order that conclusively determines an issue wholly separate from the merits of the action
and effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 299.
25. fqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)).
26. Id. (citing Hasty, 490 F.3d at 174).
27. Id. (citing Hasty, 490 F.3d at 157-58). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) re-
quires a complaint to assert "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
28. fqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing Hasty, 490 F.3d at 179 (Cabranes, J., concurring)).
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111. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN IQBAL
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues.29 First,
Ashcroft and Mueller labeled Iqbal's causes of action as legal con-
clusions and asked whether the complaint against them complied
with Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.30 The
second question presented by Ashcroft and Mueller asked whether
they could be responsible for the unconstitutional conduct of sub-
ordinate government employees, presuming they had constructive
notice of the behavior.31 Because the Court determined the first
issue to be dispositive, it neither discussed nor answered the sec-
ond question from a constructive notice perspective, 32 but never-
theless concluded that Ashcroft and Mueller cannot be liable un-
der Bivens for their subordinates' actions.33
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.34 In a five-
to-four majority, the Court reversed the district court's order deny-
ing the motion to dismiss.35 The majority held that Iqbal's com-
plaint contained insufficient factual matter to meet the plausibil-
ity standard of Rule 8(a)(2) established in Twombly. 36
Justice Kennedy began the Court's analysis by noting that al-
though Bivens recognizes that federal officials may be liable to
private citizens for their subordinates' unconstitutional conduct, 37
29. Id. at 1955-56 (Souter, J., dissenting). Only the dissent, not the majority, expressly
mentioned the two specific issues granted on certiorari. Id. While the majority did not
answer the second issue, the dissent remarks that it "sua sponte decide[d] the scope of
supervisory liability." Id. at 1956.
30. Id. at 1955. In his dissent, Justice Souter noted that this question really probed
whether the Second Circuit incorrectly interpreted and applied Twombly in deciding to
affirm the order denying the motion to dismiss. Id. at 1956.
31. Id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1937 (majority opinion).
33. Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
34. Id. at 1941 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined. Id.
35. Id. at 1954
36. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote that Iqbal's "complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to
state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination against [Ashcroft and Muller]."
Id.
37. Id. at 1947-48 (citing Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66). The majority noted that Bivens
actions are implied, and as a result, are not encouraged. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. The
Court explained that it previously "declined to extend Bivens" to a First Amendment viola.
tion in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), and could have dismissed Iqbal's First Amend-
ment-related cause of action for this reason. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. Because Ashcroft
and Mueller failed to make this argument, however, the court "assume [s], without deciding,
that [Iqbal]'s First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens." Id.
177
178 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
Bivens actions may not be pursued on the basis of vicarious liabil-
ity or respondeat superior.38 The majority explained that the com-
plaint must illustrate that both Ashcroft and Mueller personally
breached Iqbal's rights under the Constitution.39 To accomplish
this, Justice Kennedy clarified that Iqbal must illustrate that
Ashcroft and Mueller created and carried out the FBI policy of
holding Arab Muslim men in the ADMAX SHU to discriminate
against them based on their ethnicity or religious beliefs.40
Iqbal challenged the majority's interpretation and suggested in-
stead that if Ashcroft and Mueller knew and yet ignored such
prejudicial imprisonment by their employees, they may be respon-
sible based on "supervisory liability."41 The majority, however,
reasoned that supervisory liability and vicarious liability are the
same theory.42 Justice Kennedy explained that in First and Fifth
Amendment Bivens actions, only the supervisor's personal dis-
criminatory purpose creates the cause of action, and recognizing a
supervisor's knowledge of a subordinate's prejudicial intent as ac-
tionable creates vicarious liability under respondeat superior. 43
The majority then discussed the sufficiency of Iqbal's com-
plaint.44 Justice Kennedy put forth two inherent factors from
Twombly: (1) legal conclusions are not entitled to the presumption
of truth, and (2) implausible claims for relief must be dismissed.45
The Court mandated that facts accompany legal conclusion-based
allegations. 46 By this reasoning, the majority disregarded Iqbal's
38. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. Vicarious liability is "[Iliability that a supervisory party
(such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such
as an employee) based on the relationship between the two parties." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 998. Respondeat superior is "[tihe doctrine holding an em-
ployer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the
scope of the employment or agency." Id. at 1426.
39. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. Justice Kennedy explained that he began by describing
the elements "a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination
against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity," because the Twvombly
Court also began by listing elements of an antitrust dispute. Id. at 1947 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 553-54).
40. Id. at 1948-49. First, the majority said that "the plaintiff must plead and prove
that the defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose." Id. at 1948. Then, the Court
defined the purpose as "adopt[ing] and implement[ing] the detention policies at issue not
for a neutral investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race,
religion, or national origin." Id. at 1948-49.
41. Id. at 1949.
42. Id.
43. Id. (explaining that "Government official[s] . [are] only liable for his or her own
misconduct" and "purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability").
44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
45. Id. at 1949-50.
46. Id. at 1950.
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assertions that Ashcroft and Mueller detained him based on his
ethnicity or religion, that Ashcroft created this procedure, and
that Mueller implemented the policy. 47 Although Justice Kennedy
recognized that the assertions might in fact have merit, he
deemed the allegations legal conclusions, the veracity of which
may never be assumed.48
Next, the majority ascertained whether any of the remaining
non-conclusory claims plausibly warranted relief for Iqbal.49 The
Court clarified that if another, more probable reason for a defen-
dant's actions exists, a plaintiff's claim fails to meet Twombly's
plausibility standard.50 To that effect, the Court noted that Iqbal's
remaining claims included allegations that, while managed by
Mueller, the FBI imprisoned other men based on their Middle
Eastern heritage and Islamic faith, and that Ashcroft and Mueller
endorsed a policy to detain these men in the ADiVIX SHU until
the FBI could disprove their involvement in terrorism. 5'
The majority concluded that these claims were not plausible.52
Justice Kennedy recognized that Iqbal's allegations, assuming
their veracity, might have manifested discrimination by Ashcroft
and Muller;53 however, the emergent circumstances surrounding
the September 11th attacks proved more persuasive to the
Court.54 The majority emphasized that Arab Muslim men mas-
terminded and implemented the September 11th terrorist attack
47. Id. at 1950-51. The Court eliminated the assertions that Ashcroft and Mueller
'"knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal]' to harsh condi-
tions of confinement 'as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest,'" that "Ashcroft was the 'principal
architect' of [the] invidious policy," and that "Mueller was 'instrumental' in adopting and
executing [the policy]." Id. at 1951 (quoting Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 96, 10, 11).
48. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (stating that the Court does "not reject these bald allega-
tions on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. .. . [It is the conclusory na-
ture of [the] allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles
them to the presumption of truth.").
49. Id. at 1950.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1951. The remaining allegations the Court considered were that "the [FBI,
under the direction of [Petitioner] MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab
Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the events of September ii," and that "[tihe
policy of holding post-September-lith detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confine-
ment until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by [Petitioners] ASHCROFT and
MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001." Id. (citing Complaint,
supra note 6, paras. 47, 69).
52. Id. at 1950-51.
53. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Justice Kennedy stated: "Taken as true, these allega-
tions are consistent with petitioners' purposefully designating detainees 'of high interest'
because of their race, religion, or national origin." Id.
54. Id.
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as members of an Islamic extremist group led by another Arab
Muslim man, Osama bin Laden.55 The Court stated that Ashcroft
and Mueller, in their capacity as government officials, allowed the
detention of illegal aliens prospectively associated with the Arab
Muslim hijackers and al Qaeda until the FBI proved otherwise. 56
Considering the relationship between the Arab Muslim terrorists
and the attacks, Justice Kennedy concluded that Ashcroft and
Mueller's actions after September 11th in detaining Iqbal and
other men of Middle Eastern descent could not plausibly result
from discrimination. 57
The majority further indicated that regardless of plausibility,
Iqbal failed to plead that Ashcroft and Mueller acted with the in-
tent to discriminate against him and other Arab Muslim men.5 8
Because his complaint alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller's subor-
dinates prejudicially detained him, and that Ashcroft and Mueller
merely allowed the ADMAX SHU placements, the Court held that
Iqbal failed to show his entitlement to relief from Ashcroft and
Mueller.59
After eliminating the complaint's legal conclusion allegations
and ruling the assertion of discrimination implausible, Justice
Kennedy concluded that Iqbal was not entitled to relief from
Ashcroft and Mueller pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2). 60 In doing so, the
Court rejected Iqbal's three arguments to the contrary.6' First,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 195 1-52. The majority reasoned as follows:
It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to
arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of
the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. . .. [Tihe arrests Mueller over-
saw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens
who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to
those who committed terrorist acts. As between that 'obvious alternative explanation'
for the arrests . . . and the purposeful, invidious discrimination [Iqbal] asks us to in-
fer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
58. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952. Justice Kennedy ruled that Iqbal's complaint failed to
plead "any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest [Ashcroft and Muellerl's dis-
criminatory state of mind." Id.
59. Id. The Court stated that "fall [Iqbal's complaint] plausibly suggests is that the
Nation's top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack,
sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the sus-
pects could be cleared of terrorist activity." Id.
60. Id. Justice Kennedy remarked that, although Iqbal's complaint was insufficient for
recovery from Ashcroft and Mueller, the Court made no ruling on the sufficiency of the
complaint against other defendants not before the Court who possibly engaged in "serious
official misconduct." Id.
61. Id. at 1952.
Iqbal proposed that the Court's decision in Twombly applied only
to antitrust pleadings. 62  The majority refused to constrain
Twombly to antitrust litigation.63 Justice Kennedy reasoned that
because Twombly interpreted Rule 8, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure necessarily mandates that Twombly must apply
to every complaint filed in a civil action.64
Ashcroft and Mueller initially raised qualified immunity as a
defense, and as a result, the Second Circuit assured that discovery
against both Ashcroft and Meuller would be limited. 65 Conse-
quently, Iqbal argued that Twombly's interpretation of Rule 8
should be moderated proportionately to the limitations placed on
discovery. 66 Justice Kennedy explained that in Twombly, the
Court rejected this argument, as discovery limitations are not
relevant to granting or denying a motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.67 As a
policy consideration, the Court noted that Ashcroft and Mueller
could raise the qualified immunity defense to continue their offi-
cial duties and avoid delay of their work by participating in com-
plete discovery. 68
Iqbal's final argument contended that Rule 9 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permitted his complaint to plead gener-
ally Ashcroft and Mueller's prejudicial purpose.69 He argued that
Ashcroft and Mueller discriminated against him because of his
religion, race, and/or ethnicity, and that he was entitled to plead
the allegation as stated.70 The majority recognized that although
Rule 9 may allow, in some cases, plaintiffs to plead certain ele-
ments of a cause of action generally, it granted Iqbal no such
right.7' Instead, the Court decreed that Rule 9 merely relieved
62. Id. at 1953.
63. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
64. Id. The opinion clarified that Rule 1 applies to "all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts," so an interpretation of Rule 8 necessarily applies to all
types of civil actions, not just antitrust litigation, as in Twombly. Id. (quoting FED. R. CrV.
P. 1).
65. Id. at 1953-54.
66. Id. at 1953. The Court called this the "careful-case-management" approach, which
it rejected in Twombly. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559).
67. Id. at 1953 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559).
68. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
69. Id. at 1954. Rule 9(b) allows "[mialice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person's mind [to] be alleged generally." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
70. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. Iqbal alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller "discriminated
against him 'on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest."' Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 6, para. 96).
71. Id. at 1954. The Court explained that:
Winter 2010 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 181
182 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 48
Iqbal from pleading at a heightened level, but did not allow him to
state his allegations in the form of legal conclusions. 72 After de-
claring Iqbal's complaint deficient, the majority opinion concluded
by reversing the order denying the motion to dismiss and remand-
ing to the Second Circuit.73
B. Justice Souter's Dissent
A dissenting Justice Souter argued that the majority eliminated
Bivens's theory of supervisory liability and improperly exploited
Twombly. 74 The dissenting opinion began by dissecting the issues
presented in Ashcroft and Mueller's petition for certiorari.75 Re-
garding the first issue, Justice Souter noted that Ashcroft and
Mueller chose to inquire about the sufficiency of Iqbal's complaint,
instead of their supervisory liability under Bivens.76 With respect
to the second issue, the dissent observed that Ashcroft and Muel-
ler questioned whether they could be liable on the grounds of con-
structive notice of subordinate prejudice, even though Iqbal in no
way pled that Ashcroft and Mueller had constructive notice.77
Justice Souter emphasized that both questions presented by
Ashcroft and Mueller conceded that supervisory liability may be
asserted under Bivens.78 Moreover, the dissent stated that al-
[The Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint's conclusory state-
ments without reference to its factual context... . Rule 8 does not empower [Iqbal] to
plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label 'general allegation,' and
expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The opinion stated that the Second Circuit could choose to remand to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, where Iqbal could request to amend the
complaint. Id.
74. Id. at 1954-55 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined the dissenting opinion. Id.
75. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955.
76. Id. at 1956. The first issue, which pertained to pleading, asked the Court
"[wihether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official
knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts pur-
portedly committed by subordinate officials is sufficient to state individual-capacity claims
against those officials under Bivens." Id. at 1955 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I,
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, (No. 07-1015), 2008 WTL 336225 [hereinafter Petition]).
77. Id. at 1956. The second issue, which pertained to liability, asked the Court
"[wihether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally li-
able for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as
high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried
out by such subordinate officials." Id. (citing Petition, supra note 76, at II). Justice Souter
pointed out that "[tihis was an odd question to pose, since Iqbal has never claimed that
Ashcroft and Mueller are liable on a constructive notice theory." Id.
78. Id.
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though the two issues neither requested a determination of the
elements of supervisory liability or its scope, the majority decided
both anyway.79
The dissent stressed the inappropriate nature of the majority's
discussion of supervisory liability scope for three reasons.80 Fore-
most, Justice Souter explained that Ashcroft and Mueller already
agreed that supervisory liability under Bivens applies when a su-
perior recognizes and disregards discrimination by their subordi-
nates.8' This test, argued the dissent, should be the standard for
Iqbal to prove Bivens supervisory liability.82
Second, Justice Souter opined that the parties neither briefed
nor argued the scope and elements of supervisory liability because
Ashcroft and Mueller conceded its possibility.83 Justice Souter
adamantly disapproved of the majority's decision dismissing su-
pervisory liability without briefing or oral argument on the issue.84
Third, the dissent accentuated that Iqbal never had an opportu-
nity to argue the issue of supervisory liability.85 The dissenting
opinion identified Iqbal's reliance on the concession as warranted
and its dismissal as unjust.8 6  Justice Souter highlighted the sig-
nificance of the Court's dismissal of supervisory liability8 7 and its
missteps in doing so without briefs and argument.88 The dissent-
ers also expressed their amazement at the majority's denounce-
ment of supervisory liability when, without discussing Iqbal's al-
79. Id. The dissent indicated that "[wlithout acknowledging the parties' agreement as
to the standard of supervisory liability, the Court asserts that it must sua sponte decide the
scope of supervisory liability here." Id.
80. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1957.
82. Id. The dissent additionally noted that the Court "do[es] not normally override a
party's concession." Id. (citing United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855
(1996)).
83. Id. at 1957.
84. Id. Justice Souter explained that he "[is] unsure what the general test for supervi-
sory liability should be, and in the absence of briefing and argument [he is] in no position to
choose or devise one." Id. at 1958.
85. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. The dissent remarked that "the Court's approach is most unfair to Iqbal," be-
cause "[hie was entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller's concession," and that "[bly over-
riding that concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question."
Id.
87. Id. Justice Souter exclaimed, "Lest there be any mistake, in these words the major.
ity is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory
liability entirely." Id.
88. Id. at 1958. The dissent first noted that the "dichotomy" of "respondeat superior ...
or no supervisory liability at all . .. is false." Id. It next listed cases from different circuits
that discuss the differences between respondeat superior and supervisory liability. Id.
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legations, it dismissed the supervisory liability claims as legal
conclusions.89
The second section of the dissent argued that Iqbal's complaint
met the standard of Rule 8(a)(2). 90 Justice Souter found that
Iqbal's allegations fulfilled Twombly's plausibility standard, as his
complaint contended that Ashcroft and Mueller not only recog-
nized and acquiesced to their employees' prejudice, but also con-
structed the policy to detain Arab Muslim men based on their re-
ligion and national origin.91 In disagreeing with Ashcroft and
Mueller's understanding and the majority's application of
Twombly's plausibility standard, Justice Souter emphasized that
Twombly mandates a court to assume the truth of every accusa-
tion in a complaint, regardless of a judge's own uncertainties. 9 2
The dissent also disagreed that Iqbal's allegations were legal
conclusions. 93 According to the dissent, Iqbal's complaint met
Twombly's plausibility standard by claiming ethnic and religious
discrimination and/or unconcern by Ashcroft and Mueller for such
discrimination. 94 Justice Souter agreed that the only two allega-
tions considered by the majority did not sufficiently establish
Iqbal's right to relief and that the policies implemented by
Ashcroft and Mueller to prevent additional terrorist attacks nega-
tively impacted Arab Muslim men.95
But, Justice Souter argued, Iqbal's assertions-catalogued by
the majority as legal conclusions-must be viewed in relation to
89. Id.
90. Iqbal, 129 S. ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1959. The dissent concluded that:
The complaint thus alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft and Mueller knew of
and condoned the discriminatory policy their subordinates carried out. Actually, the
complaint goes further in alleging that Ashcroft and Muller [sic] affirmatively acted
to create the discriminatory detention policy. If these factual allegations are true,
Ashcroft and Mueller were, at the very least, aware of the discriminatory policy being
implemented and deliberately indifferent to it.
Id.
92. Id. Justice Souter pointed out that "[tlhe sole exception to this rule lies with allega-
tions that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green
men, or the plaintiff's recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is not what
we have here." Id.
93. Id. at 1960.
94. Id. The dissenters believed that "Iqbal's complaint ... contains 'enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
95. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "Ashcroft and Muel-
ler 'sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the
suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity' . . . produc [ing] 'a disparate, incidental impact
on Arab Muslims,"' and that "the two allegations selected by the majority, standing alone,
do not state a plausible entitlement to relief for unconstitutional discrimination").
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other specific facts set forth in the complaint. 96 The dissent ex-
plained that the complaint made no legal conclusions because
Iqbal's specific allegations supported his broader claims.97 Justice
Souter concluded by expressing confusion and concern as to the
Court's decision to label certain allegations conclusory and others
not.98
C. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer filed an additional dissent. 99 In it, he flatly dis-
agreed with the majority's application of Twombly. 100 He ex-
plained that the qualified immunity defense and discovery limita-
tions sufficiently shielded both Ashcroft and Mueller in their offi-
cial duties as government officials from superfluous legal proceed-
ings and any interpretation of Twombly was unwarranted.101
96. Id. at 1961. Justice Souter elucidated that "[vli ewed in light of these subsidiary
allegations, the allegations singled out by the majority as 'conclusory' are no such thing."
Id.
97. Id. at 1960-61. For example, the dissent listed the subsidiary claim that "the Chief
of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section and the Assistant Special Agent in
Charge for the FBI's New York Field Office implemented a policy that discriminated
against Arab Muslim men, including Iqbal, solely on account of their race, religion, or na-
tional origin." Id. at 1960. The dissent referred to, but did not quote, a section of Iqbal's
complaint describing subordinate FBI agents discriminatorily detaining Arab Muslim men
in the MDC's ADMAX SHU. Id. at 1960-61 (citing Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 47-53).
98. Id. at 1960-61. The dissent stated that the allegation accepted as true "makes two
points: (1) after September 11, the FBI held certain detainees in highly restrictive condi-
tions, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller discussed and approved these conditions." Id. at 1961.
The dissenters questioned why "these allegations are not conclusory, [but] . .. the majority
deems it merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that" (1) the FBI made "high interest" classi-
fications based on ethnicity and religion, not on "evidence ... supporting terrorist activity,"
and (2) that "Ashcroft and Mueller 'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed' to that discrimination." Id. (citing Complaint, supra note 6, paras. 48-50, 96).
99. Id. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that he concurs with Jus-
tice Souter's dissent. Id.
100. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer explained that he
"believe[s] it important to prevent unwarranted litigation from interfering with 'the proper
execution of the work of the Government' . . . [b]ut . .. cannot find in that need adequate
justification for the Court's interpretation of [Twombly]." Id.
101. Id.
185
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IV. THE LEGISLATION AND PRECEDENT LEADING TO IQBAL
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Dioguardi v. Durn-
ing
The United States implemented the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1938. 102 The drafters of the Rules sought to escape the
demanding intricacies of code pleading in favor of an amenable
and versatile method of pleading.103 The Rules, unlike the codes,
do not require that plaintiffs put forth a certain amount of fact
equal to a cause of action.10 4 As a result, the Rules require that a
complaint consist only of "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 05
Judge Charles E. Clark, a major architect of the Rules, ruled on
the sufficiency of a complaint in the 1944 dispute of Dioguardi v.
Durning,06 a case later adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Conley v. Gibson. 07 In Dioguardi, the defendant, a cus-
toms collector, refused to deliver plaintiffs inventory for failure to
pay certain fees owed.' 08 A year later, the defendant sold the
plaintiffs products at an auction.109 The plaintiff then filed a com-
plaint, which specifically alleged that the defendant "sold [his]
merchandise to another bidder with [plaintiffs bidding] price of
$110, and not [defendant's asking] price of $120," and "that three
weeks before the sale, two cases [of plaintiffs inventory] disap-
peared.""10
102. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2004).
103. Id. § 1216. Code pleading was "[a] procedural system requiring that the pleader
allege merely the facts of the case giving rise to the claim, not the legal conclusions neces-
sary to sustain the claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1271. The original
"code," adopted in New York and created by David Dudley Field, obliged plaintiffs to give
"1statement[s] of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language,
without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding
to know what is intended." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574. The creators of the Federal Rules of
Civil procedure sought to remedy the codes' "virtuapl] impossib[ility of] ... distinguishing]
among 'ultimate facts,' evidence,' and 'conclusions'- in drafting Rule 8. Id. at 574-75 (quot-
ing Weinsten & Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57
COLum. L. REV. 518, 520-521 (1957)).
104. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 102, § 1216.
105. FED. R. CTV. P. 8(a)(2).
106. . 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); see also 5 WRIGHT & MILER, supra note 102, § 1220.
107. Conley, 355 U.S. 41, abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.




Winter 2010Ashcroft v. Iqbal17
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted."' Writing for the Second
Circuit, Judge Clark reversed the dismissal and declared the com-
plaint adequate under the newly enacted Rule 8(a).112 Even
though inartfully pled, the Second Circuit found the claim for re-
lief sufficient as it nevertheless asserted that the defendant sold
and disposed of the plaintiff's merchandise and notified the defen-
dant of the plaintiff s claims against him."13
B. The Fifty-Year-Reign of the "No Set of Facts" Rule: Conley v.
Gibson
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court adopted "the ac-
cepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief' in Conley v. Gibson."14 In Conley, African-American
railroad employees brought suit against their union for failing to
represent them after their employer removed them from their po-
sitions and replaced them with Caucasian employees."15 The un-
ion moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted."16 The district and appellate courts ignored the
failure to state a claim argument and held that only the National
Railroad Adjustment Board had jurisdiction to hear the case and
dismissed the complaint."17
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal for lack of jurisdic-
tion and instead assessed the adequacy of the plaintiff's com-
plaint."18 Justice Black explained that under the Rules, a com-
111. Id. The district court allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Id. at 775.
After plaintiff amended his complaint, the district court again dismissed for failure to state
a claim. Id.
112. Id. at 775 (explaining that "[u~nder the new rules of civil procedure, there is no
pleading requirement of stating 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,' but only
that there be 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief"').
113. Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at 775. The court noted that it "appears ... that [plaintiff] was
actually the first bidder at the price for which they were sold, and hence was entitled to the
merchandise." Id.
114. 355 U.S. at 45-46. The Court cited Diogaurdi in a footnote. Id. at 46 n.5.
115. Id. at 43. A contract between the union and the employer existed and stated that
the employer would neither terminate nor demote union member employees. Id. The
Railway Labor Act mandated that the union represent the railroad workers. Id.
116. Id. The union gave three reasons for the complaint to be dismissed: (1) lack of
jurisdiction, (2) failure to join a third necessary party, and (3) failure to state a claim. Id.
117. Id. at 43-44.
118. Id. at 45.
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plaint need only notify the defendant of the plaintiffs allega-
tions"19 and the "no set of facts" rule mandated that a complaint
must survive a motion to dismiss absent the impossibility of plain-
tiff s presentation of any fact in favor of the claim.120
The complaint asserted that the employer fired and demoted
forty-five African American employees and then filled the posi-
tions with Caucasian workers.12' It continued in alleging that,
when prompted by the discharged and demoted union-member
employees, the union failed to take action on their behalf. 22 The
Court held that the complaint satisfied Rule 8(a) by pleading facts
that gave notice to the union of the allegations against them' 2 3
and that if confirmed would establish the union's breach of con-
tract and violation of the Railway Labor Act.'124
C. The Evolution of Rule 8: Papasan, Leatherman, and
Swierkiewicz
Thirty years later in Papasan v. Allain,125 the Court ruled that
although Rule 8 does not require an exhaustive presentation of
factual matters in a complaint, a plaintiff may not assert and rely
on mere legal conclusions in a claim for relief. 26 In Papasan, the
plaintiffs, who were Native American school officials, pled that
funding disparities resulting from the actions of defendant state
officials "deprived [Native American] schoolchildren of a mini-
mally adequate level of education." 27
Writing for the majority, Justice White clarified that unlike con-
tentions of fact,' 28 legal conclusions-even when styled as fact-
119. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. The Court explained that under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a plaintiff need not "set out i detail the facts upon which he bases his claim....
[A]ll1 the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id.
120. Id. at 45-46. Justice Black wrote that "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id.
121. Id. at 43 (stating that the complaint "allege[d] that the Union had failed in general
to represent [African-American] employees equally and in good faith").
122. Id.
123. Id. at 48 (holding that "we have no doubt that petitioners' complaint adequately set
forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis").
124. Conley, 355 U.S. at 46. Justice Black explained that "[ilf these allegations are
proven there has been a manifest breach of the Union's statutory duty to represent fairly
and without hostile discrimination all of the employees in the bargaining unit." Id.
125. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
126. Pczpasan, 478 U.S. at 286.
127. Id. at 274.
128. Id. at 283 (citing Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1957)).
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are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 29 The Papasan Court
noted that the complaint failed to plead any factual matter relat-
ing to the students' lack of education. 30 For example, the majority
remarked that the plaintiffs even failed to assert that the students
received a substandard basic education.' 3' Because the plaintiffs'
claim for relief solely relied on a legal conclusion, the Court dis-
missed the "minimally adequate education" deprivation claim. 3 2
Conflicts arose between the circuits regarding the validity of
"heightened pleading standard[s]" requiring more than a short
and plain statement under Rule 8.133 In Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 34 plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendants, narcotics agents, after the
execution of search warrants by defendants. 35 The Fifth Circuit
demanded that to satisfy the higher pleading standard for munici-
pal liability, a plaintiff must not only plead specific facts indicat-
ing their cause of action, but also indicate why the defendants'
immunity defense is untenable. 136 Both the district and appellate
court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for failing to meet the stricter
pleading requirement. 37
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, articu-
lated that the Fifth Circuit's stringent pleading standard directly
conflicted with Rule 8 and notice pleading. 38 The opinion stressed
that Rule 8 simply requires "a short and plain statement of the
claim," and that Rule 9(b) provides for additional pleading re-
129. Id. at 286 (explaining that "for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take
all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation").
130. Id.
131. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. The majority remarked that the plaintiffs "do not allege
that schoolchildren .. . are not taught to read or write; they do not allege that they receive
no instruction on even the educational basics." Id.
132. Id.
133. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 164 (1993). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated the issue as "whether a federal court
may apply a 'heightened pleading standard'--more stringent than the usual pleading re-
quirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-in civil rights cases alleg-
ing municipal liability under ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164.
134. Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163.
135. Id. at 164-65. Officers entered plaintiffs' homes on the suspicion of narcotics manu-
facturing. Id. at 165. The complaint specifically alleged that officers assaulted one indi-
vidual after execution of the search warrant on his home and that officers killed the dogs of
another individual whose home they entered. Id.
136. Id. at 167 (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)).
137. Id. at 165.
138. Id. at 168 (elucidating that "it is impossible to square the 'heightened pleading
standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of 'notice plead-
ing' set up by the Federal Rules").
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quirements in fraud and mistake allegations only.'8 9 The Court
concluded by reversing the dismissal and reaffirming that com-
plaints must give notice to the defendant of the allegations against
them and rejecting the applied heightened pleading standard. 40
In the 2002 case of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,'4' the Court clari-
fied that a complaint need not plead every element to a prima fa-
cie case in employment discrimination to survive a motion to dis-
miss.14 2 In Swierkiewicz, a Hungarian plaintiff alleged that his
employer's chief executive officer violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964143 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967144
by demoting him and, after filing grievances, discharging him and
filling his position with a younger, less experienced employee. 45
The district court, later affirmed by the Second Circuit, dismissed
the complaint for failure to plead the elements in a prima facie
case of employment discrimination. 146
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court
and Second Circuit. 47 "The prima facie case," emphasized the
Court, "is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement."14 8
Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court, made it clear
that the requirement of the prima facie case applies only to the
evidence and the burden of proof necessary to allow the Court to
139. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the Federal
Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the need for greater particularity in pleading
certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to com-
plaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio unius est exclusio altenius." Id.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is "[a] canon of construction holding that to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 661.
140. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69.
141. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
142. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512; see generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 102, §
1216 (stating that "the Supreme Court [in Swierkiewicz] suggests that at least in some
circumstances all the elements of a prima facie case need not be pled").
143. Id. at 509 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006)).
144. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (2006)).
145. Id. at 508. The complaint alleged that the CEO, a Frenchman, filled the Hungarian
plaintiff's position with another Frenchman. Id. The plaintiff requested a severance pack.
age after the demotion, at which point the employer informed the plaintiff he could quit or
be terminated. Id. at 509.
146. Id. at 509. The Court listed the following elements in the prima facie case for em-
ployment discrimination: (1) plaintiff's status in a protected group of persons; (2) aptitude
for the position denied; (3) "adverse employment action"; and (4) other evidence allowing
the "inference of discrimination." Id. at 510. The Second Circuit's prima facie case stan-
dard developed from the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 509.
147. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
148. Id. at 510.
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infer discrimination. 1 4 9 The Court stressed that using the prima
facie case as the absolute test for Rule 8 compliance directly
clashed with Rule 8(a)(2).150
Justice Thomas declared the plaintiff's complaint adequate be-
cause it pled sufficient factual matter to notify the defendant of
the alleged claims.' 5' The complaint specifically asserted that the
defendant fired the plaintiff based on his Hungarian national ori-
gin and his age, providing accounts of incidents prior to termina-
tion, pertinent dates, and the national origin and ages of other
employees. 52 The Court reversed the dismissal, reiterating that
the Rules fail to present standards for heightened pleading, and
even though a plaintiff's recovery based solely on a reading of her
complaint may seem far-fetched, Rule 8 does not require pleading
of the prima-facie case.' 53
D. The "Retirement" of Conley: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Fifty years after deciding Conley, the Court overruled its "no set
of facts" test in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.154 In Twombly,
plaintiff's complaint alleged two violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act:'15 5 first, that defendant companies "'.engaged in par-
allel conduct' . . . to inhibit the growth of upstart" companies, 56
and second, that the defendant companies "agree[d] . .. to refrain
149. Id. (holding that "the prima facie case relates to the employee's burden of present-
ing evidence that raises an inference of discrimination").
150. Id. at 512. Justice Thomas explained that "[tihe precise requirements of a prima
facie case can vary depending upon the context and were 'never intended to be rigid,
mechanized, or ritualistic."' Id.
151. Id. at 514.
152. Id.
153. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))
(explaining that "the Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for
employment discrimination suits"). The Court emphasized that "it may appear on the face
of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely, that is not the test" for ade-
quacy of a complaint. Id. at 515. The Court also explained that the only method to procure
"1greater specificity for particular claims is . .. 'by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."' Id. (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168).
154. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. Plaintiffs brought a potential anti-trust class action
against telecommunication companies. Id. at 550.
155. Id. at 548 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
156. Id. at 550. The plaintiff alleged that after a 1996 act forced the then-monopoly
companies to restructure, the companies acted similarly and by agreement to continue
providing services in a manner inconsistent with the act and unfairly to consumers. Id.
The complaint asserted that the companies "ma[de] unfair agreements with [upstart com-
panies] for access to [defendants] networks, provid[ed] inferior connections to the networks,
overcharg[ed], and bill[ed] in ways designed to sabotage the [upstart companies] relations
with their own customers." Id.
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from competing against one another."157 The district court dis-
missed plaintiffs' complaint as inadequate, 58 while the Second
Circuit reversed the dismissal.159 Justice Souter, writing for the
majority, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. 160
1. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
The Court emphasized that a complaint may not rely solely on
legal conclusions, 61 nullified the holding in Conley for a plausibil-
ity standard, 6 2 and found plaintiffs' complaint inadequate on the
grounds of implausibility.16 3 Twombly established a "plausibility"
157. Id. at 551. The specific allegations from the complaint included "failure 'to mean-
ingfully pursue' 'attractive business opportunities' in contiguous markets where they pos-
sessed 'substantial competitive advantages"' and one CEO's statement "that competing in
the territory of another [monopoly company] 'might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but
that doesn't make it right."' Id. (quoting Consol. Amended Class Action Complaint paras.
40-42, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), 2003 WL
25629874 [hereinafter Class Action Complaint]). Justice Souter pointed out the complaint's
fundamental claims:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between [defendants] in one another's
markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from [other companies] within their respective local telephone and/or
high speed internet services markets and the other facts and market circumstances
alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that the [defendants]
have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry
in their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and
have agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated customers and
markets to one another.
Id. (quoting Class Action Complaint, supra, para. 51).
158. Id. at 552. The district court ruled that "allegations of parallel business conduct,
taken alone, do not state a claim under § 1" and failing to "allege facts suggesting that
refraining from competing. ... was contrary to [defendants] apparent economic interests..
[and] does not raise an inference that the [defendants] actions were the result of conspir-
acy." Id. (citations omitted).
159. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553. The Second Circuit believed that "plus factors are not
required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive
dismissal." Id. (emphasis in original). Instead, the Second Circuit applied Conley: "[T]o
rule that allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspir-
acy claim, a court would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of collu-
sion rather than coincidence." Id.
160. Id. at 570.
161. Id. at 555. The majority explained that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need de-
tailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'enti-
tlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Id. (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 561. Justice Souter remarked that "Conley's 'no set of facts' language has
been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough." Id. at 562.
163. Id. at 564. The majority took issue with Conley's no-set-of-facts standard on the
grounds that "any statement revealing the theory of the claim will suffice unless its factual
impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings." Id. at 561. Conley also, argued
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standard for complaints that requires "enough fact to raise a rea-
sonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement." 164 Plausibility still requires a court to assume a com-
plaint's allegations as true, even if the judge believes it unlikely
that the pleader will be able to produce factual poof, and that re-
covery is improbable.165
The Court found the complaint in Twombly insufficient for al-
leging only legal conclusions 66 and that such legal conclusions
additionally failed to notify the defendants of the specific claims
against them. 67 Justice Souter reinforced that plaintiffs need not
use detailed factual pleading, 68 but even after assuming their al-
legations to be true, the complaint did not meet the plausibility
standard and, as a result, could not survive the motion to dis-
miss.'69
the majority, allows the pleading of legal conclusions. Id. (explaining that Conley allows "a
wholly conclusory statement of (a] claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the
pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 'set of undis-
closed facts' to support recovery"). Id. Justice Souter then pronounced that Conley may not
establish the lowest possible level of pleading sufficiency, but instead provides the "breadth
of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims." Id. at 563.
164. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. The Court "h[eld] that stating such a claim requires a
complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was
made." Id. (clarifying that "[aisking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not
impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement").
165. Id. at 556. The majority requires that judges assume a plaintiffs allegations as
true, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and
'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely."' Id.
166. Id. at 564. Justice Souter wrote:
['rhe complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their §1 claim on descriptions of
parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement. . ... Al-
though in form a few stray statements speak directly of agreement, on fair reading
these are merely legal conclusions resting on the prior allegations."
Id.
167. Id. at 565 n.10. The majority emphasized that "the complaint here furnishes no
clue as to which of the [defendants] . .. supposedly agreed, or when and where the illicit
agreement took place. . .. [A] defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory allega-
tions . .. would have little idea where to begin." Id. The majority argued that the com-
plaint manifested only a "natural, unilateral reaction" after the 1996 act forcing the mo-
nopoly defendants to reorganize. Id. at 566. The opinion expressed that "there is no reason
to infer that the companies had agreed among themselves to do what was only natural
anyway." Id.
168. Id. at 570 (holding that "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face" are necessary).
169. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
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2. Justice Stevens'Dissent
Justice Stevens sharply dissented. 170 He contradicted Justice
Souter's remarks about the legal profession's puzzlement over
Conley, expressing that, until the majority in Twombly, no mem-
ber of the Court manifested such confusion. 17' The dissent argued
the sufficiency of the no-set-of-facts rule 72 and that the majority
annulled Conley over anxieties relating to the high cost of disputes
arising under the Sherman Act.' 73 Justice Stevens asserted the
adequacy of the complaint 74 and that the majority's actions cir-
cumvented the established rule making process.175
V. IQBAL: A CONFUSING, INCOMPLETE, AND OPPORTUNISTIC
OPINION
The majority opinion in Iqbal misapplied Twombly to achieve a
result favorable to government officials which impulsively abol-
ishes supervisory liability under Bivens, and effectively eliminates
pure notice pleading. As a result, plaintiffs may no longer rely on
their complaint's ability to notify a defendant of a pending action.
The question of how much factual matter makes a complaint
"plausible," however, has yet to be determined.
A. The Now-Impenetrable Motion to Dismiss
The Court, in its elaborations on Bivens supervisory liability
and the September 11th attacks, failed to clarify the exactness
necessary to defeat a motion to dismiss. The Court recognized
that qualified immunity halted discovery as to Ashcroft and Muel-
ler, yet failed to sympathize with Iqbal and required that he plead
170. Id. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined in the dissent, except
as to part IV. Id. at 570.
171. Id. at 578.
172. Id. at 571.
173. Id. at 577 (expressing that Conley only allows for dismissal "when proceeding to
discovery or beyond would be futile").
174. Twombly, 550. U.S. at 551 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that the
"complaint describes a variety of circumstantial evidence and makes the straightforward
allegation that petitioners 'entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent
[competition] ... and have agreed not to compete with one another."' Id. at 571. (ciations
omitted).
175. Id. Justice Stevens also noted that "Petitioners have not requested that the Conley
formulation be retired, nor have any of the six amici who filed briefs in support of petition-
ers." Id. Justice Stevens lamented that he "would not rewrite the Nation's civil procedure
textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States without far more in-
formed deliberation as to the costs of doing so. Congress has established a process-a rule-
making process-for revisions of that order."
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some additional factual matter. 76 Specifically, Justice Kennedy
failed to address exactly how Iqbal-absent discovery-would lo-
cate the facts required to fulfill the Court's pleading require-
ments. 77
Besides the specific impact on Iqbal, potential plaintiffs from all
types of civil litigation must now go beyond traditional notice
pleading to survive a motion to dismiss. 78 The Court provides
guidance to neither Iqbal nor any potential plaintiff. In its overly
simple determination that Iqbal's complaint alleges only legal con-
clusions, our highest court bamboozles plaintiffs by disregarding
fifty years of precedent, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the possibility that every plaintiff in federal court-whether they
once "understood" Twombly or not--cannot survive a motion to
dismiss because they are bound to whimsical judicial determina-
tion of "fact" or "legal conclusion."
In the two months following Iq bal, district courts cited the
Court's opinion in at least 500 rulings. 79 After Iqbal, defendants
may simply move to dismiss for plaintiffs' use of "legal conclu-
sions"-the definition of which seems ever murkier after Iqbal.
Based on the Court's broad and confusing finding of such conclu-
sions in Iqbal (even with the use of specific facts and allegations)
how can any court, in any jurisdiction, be overturned on appeal? 80
How can wronged plaintiffs with worthy claims afford such a proc-
ess? Iqbal limits plaintiffs' entry to the federal courts, by making
it nearly impossible to survive a motion to dismiss, almost cer-
176. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
177. David G. Savage, writer for the American Bar Association Journal, noted that lilt
is not clear how a former prisoner could show evidence of Ashcroft's state of mind without
being able to question officials and inspect documents." David G. Savage, Narrowing the
Courthouse Door:- High Court Makes it Tougher to Get Past the Pleading Stage, 95-JUL
A.B.A. J. 22, 23 (2009). Mr. Savage referred to the amicus brief of Harold Koh, former dean
of Yale Law School, which "calls this the catch-22 approach to civil litigation. That means,
says Koh, plaintiffs are told they must include certain facts in the pleading that can be
obtained only through discovery." Id.
178. Id. at 22. Mr. Savage's article indicates that "[n]o one seems to doubt that the
[C]ourt wants to make it harder for plaintiffs to get inside the door." Id.
179. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html?-r1l.
180. Tony Mauro, writer for The National Law Journal, noted that the "Court gave cor-
porate defendants a gift that keeps on giving: the Iqbal decision, which has made it easier
than ever for defendants to shut down lawsuits before they get to the costly discovery
stage." Tony Mauro, Plaintiffs Groups Mount Effort to Undo Supreme Court's 'Iqbal' Rul-
ing, NAV'L L. J., September 21, 2009, available at
http://www.law.comjsp/nlj/indexarticle.jsp?id=1202433931370.
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tainly requiring an appeal, and increasing the already prohibitive
costs of litigation.18'
Justice Ginsburg, who joined Justice Souter's dissent, com-
mented that the "Court's majority [in Iqbal messed up the federal
rules." 8 2 Senator Arlen Specter has even introduced legislation to
essentially undo the holdings of Twombly and Iqbal, and reinstate
Conley.'83 On behalf of worthy plaintiffs, Specter decried Iqbal for
its inevitable denial of admission to the federal judicial system, as
well as the accompanying appropriate remedy. 84
B. The Court Avoids the Qualified Immunity Defense ... But
Strongly Favors it Anyway
Justice Kennedy circumvented the issue of whether the defense
of qualified immunity shields Ashcroft and Mueller from post-
September 1 1th litigation, but used charged language that seemed
to favor the protection of government officials. For example, Jus-
tice Kennedy described the arrests of Arab Muslim men as merely
"a disparate, incidental impact" of the attacks 85 and named
Ashcroft and Mueller as "the Nation's top law enforcement offi-
cers." 8 6 The Court recognized that Iqbal's allegations, assuming
their truth, did support a finding of discrimination, but quickly
determined that as a result of the September 11th attacks,
Ashcroft and Mueller could not possibly have acted with preju-
dice.' 87
The majority concluded that Iqbal made only one plausible im-
plication in his complaint: that Ashcroft and Mueller imple-
mented a policy to imprison supposed terrorists in the ADMAX
SHU pending proof of non-involvement in terrorist activity.188 The
181. Civil Procedure expert Arthur Miller "seefs] serious problems with democratic val-
ues [in Iqbal, with access to the courts, [and] with resolution of disputes with a jury of
peers." Id.
182. Liptak, supra note 179.
183. David Ingram, Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard, NAT'L L. J.,
July 24, 2009, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/articlenlj/i*ndexarticle.jsp?.?id=1202432493166.
184. Id. Senator Specter believes the "effect of the Court's actions, will no doubt be to
deny many plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and, with it, any
legal redress for their injuries." Id.
185. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
186. Id. at 1952.
187. Id. Justice Kennedy stated that more "likely explanations" than prejudice existed
for the arrests and treatment of Iqbal and other imprisoned Arab-Muslim men. Id.
188. Id. Justice Kennedy reasoned that "[aill [Iqbal's complaint] plausibly suggests is
that" Ashcroft and Mueller "sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure condi-
tions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity." Id.
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Court intentionally failed to answer the issue of qualified immu-
nity, yet addressed Ashcroft and Mueller's role in their official du-
ties at length. The conservative majority became judicial legisla-
tors in ignoring Rule 8 and designating Iqbal's serious allegations
as legal conclusions. This case was not about pleading: at least to
the majority, Iqbal concerned the protection of Ashcroft and Muel-
ler from post-September 11th litigation, and the Court quite will-
ingly disregarded precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to do so.
C. The Answer to an Un-Asked Question
Although the Court dismissed the action for pleading insuffi-
ciency and not on the grounds of qualified immunity, the majority
still managed to eliminate supervisory Bivens liability. 89
Whether or not Bivens liability may extend to Ashcroft and Muel-
ler was not at issue on appeal, as Ashcroft and Mueller conceded
that if they exhibited indifference to the discriminatory actions of
their subordinates, they may be liable as superior government of-
ficials under Bivens. 90 The Court nonetheless held that defen-
dants can only be liable under Bivens for their own personal ac-
tions.191 The majority's impulsive decision to eliminate Bivens
applicability-when the parties neither briefed nor argued the
issue, 92 and no defendant raised the issue-further implicated the
Court's insulation of Ashcroft and Mueller from post-September
1 1th litigation, even without ruling on qualified immunity. 9 3
D. Uncertainty among the Justices
Confusion for plaintiffs remains from both the Twombly and
Iqbal opinions. Notably, Justice Souter authored not only the ma-
189. Id. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1949 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 1957-58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. For example, at oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the pleading
standard established in Twombly is:
affected by the context in which the allegations are made . .. because [in the instant
case] we're looking at litigation involving the Attorney General and the Director of
FBI in connection with their national security responsibilities . .. there ought to be
greater rigor applied to our examination of the complaint.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015). Additionally at
oral argument, counsel for Iqbal clarified that the complaint alleged that the FBI held Iqbal
and other detainees "solely based on their race, religion, and national origin." Id. at 56.
"Implausible," retorted Justice Scalia, who believed that according to such a policy, "hun-
dreds of thousands of others" would have been incarcerated. Id. at 56.
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jority opinion in Twombly, but also the dissent in Iqbal, which
suggests not a clarification of Twombly in Iqbal, but a disharmony
between the sister opinions. A dissenting Justice Souter ex-
plained that "plausible," as stated in Twombly, need not be inter-
preted to mean the only possible explanation (as did Justice Ken-
nedy in the majority opinion), but only those claims that exceed
logical and rational boundaries. 94 It is bewildering that the au-
thor of the Twombly opinion-who adamantly disapproved of the
Conley no set of facts rule-so vigorously dissented from the first
case before the Court applying and explaining Twombly. How can
plausibility under Twombly be understood when its majority au-
thor dissents from a later opinion applying exactly the same stan-
dard?
Perhaps the Court too willingly rejected the Conley test and now
finds itself undertaking the clarification of current ambiguous
pleading standards. Under the recent Twombly and Iqbal deci-
sions, plaintiffs must avoid the use of legal conclusions-or what
may be interpreted as a legal conclusion-by pleading pertinent
and illustrative facts. Specifically, the Twombly Court noted that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's Form 9 remains an ade-
quate complaint and emphasized the important elements of an
allegation as place, date, and time.195 Until the Court further in-
terprets, clarifies, or applies Iqbal, plaintiffs should, at the abso-
lute minimum, plead descriptive facts that give notice to a defen-
dant of the place, date, and time of the alleged cause of action.
Carly R. Wilson
194. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter clarified that an
implausible complaint is "sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about
little green men, or the plaintiff's recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel." Id.
195. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10. The Court noted that "the model form alleges that
the defendant struck the plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a particular
highway at a specified date and time." Id.
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